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Abstract
Consumers in many markets are uncertain about firms’ qualities and costs,
so buy based on both the price and the quality inferred from it. Optimal pricing
depends on consumer heterogeneity only when firms with higher quality have
higher costs, regardless of whether costs and qualities are private or public. If
better quality firms have lower costs, then good quality is sold cheaper than
bad under private costs and qualities, but not under public. However, if higher
quality is costlier, then price weakly increases in quality under both informational
environments.
Keywords: Bertrand competition, price signalling, incomplete information,
price dispersion.
JEL classification: D82, C72, D43.
In many markets, buyers are uncertain about the qualities and costs of sellers. In
that case, purchasing decisions depend on both the price and the quality that the
buyers infer from price (as opposed to the actual quality). This paper shows that
the pricing decisions of the firms differ based on customer heterogeneity when higher
quality producers have greater marginal cost, irrespective of whether costs and qualities
are private or public.
If firms privately know their quality and cost, and a higher quality firm has a smaller
marginal cost,1 then it signals its quality by pricing lower than a bad quality rival. By
contrast, with public qualities and costs, better quality is priced higher. In markets
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1 Many industries have higher quality associated with a lower cost, e.g. mutual funds
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where higher quality providers have larger costs, the price is constant or increases in
quality under both informational environments.
In the markets considered in this paper, competing firms independently draw a
type, either good or bad. The good type has better quality than the bad, and in the
main model also higher marginal cost. Consumers have heterogeneous valuations for
the firms’ products, with a greater valuation also implying a weakly larger premium
for quality. Each player knows her own type, but other players only have a common
prior over the types. The firms simultaneously set prices, which the consumers observe.
Then each consumer chooses either to buy from one of the firms or leave the market.
Consumers Bayes update their beliefs about the types of the firms based on the prices.
The equilibrium notion is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
In equilibrium, price is above the competitive level, regardless of whether the good
and bad types pool or the good quality firms signal their type by raising price. Prices
in pooling and semipooling equilibria exceed the cost of the good type, thus both types
of at least one firm make positive profit. In separating equilibria, both firms’ bad types
obtain positive profit.
By contrast, complete information Bertrand competition between identical firms,
whether good or bad quality, leads to zero profit and a lower price than under incomplete
information. Complete information competition between a good and a bad firm may
raise price compared to private cost and quality, but one of the types still makes zero
profit. The ex ante expected price may be higher or lower under complete information.
The ex ante price dispersion under public types exceeds that under private. If the cost
and quality differences between the types vanish or the probability of the good type
goes to zero, then the complete and incomplete information environments converge
to the same price: the marginal cost of the bad type. The outcome in this paper is
independent of whether the firms observe each other’s cost or quality, but relies on
consumers not observing these.
The equilibrium pricing differs from a privately informed monopolist, and from
competition when consumers find it costly to learn prices. A monopolist with good
quality signals its type by a high price. When observing the prices of competing firms
(Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu´, 2009), cotton weaving (Bloom et al., 2013), medical innovations
(Nelson et al., 2009). Additional empirical examples and theoretical reasons for negatively correlated
quality and cost are in Heinsalu (2019).
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is costly, the outcome under complete information is monopoly pricing (Diamond, 1971).
Incomplete information leads to above-monopoly pricing in costly search, except when
quality and cost are negatively correlated, in which case pricing is competitive (Heinsalu,
2019).
Literature. The signalling literature started from Spence (1973), and price as a
signal was studied in Milgrom and Roberts (1986). In the present paper, the consumers
are the receivers of the price signal, unlike in limit pricing (Milgrom and Roberts (1982)
and the literature following) where the incumbent deters potential entrants from enter-
ing the market by signalling its low cost via a low price.
Bertrand competition has been combined with price signalling in Janssen and Roy
(2015), where consumers are homogeneous and firms may verifiably disclose their types.
In Sengupta (2015), consumers may or may not value quality, but are otherwise homo-
geneous. Bertrand competing firms publicly invest to obtain a random private quality
improvement, and signal quality via price.
Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001a) assume that one firm has high and the other
low quality (firm types are perfectly negatively correlated, thus firms know each other’s
type) and that cost does not depend on quality. Firms may signal via price or adver-
tising. Full separation requires advertising.
Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001b); Daughety and Reinganum (2007, 2008) con-
sider Hotelling competition with quality differences (thus both horizontal and vertical
differentiation). Daughety and Reinganum (2007, 2008) focus on symmetric separating
equilibria. Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001b) show the nonexistence of full separa-
tion, similarly to the current work.
If firm types only differ in their private marginal cost, but not quality, then the
high cost type prices at its marginal cost, but the low cost type mixes over a range of
prices strictly above its marginal cost and weakly below the price of the high-cost type
(Spulber, 1995).
The next section sets up the model and Section 2 characterises the equilibrium set,
first when cost and quality are positively associated. Negative correlation is examined
in Section 2.3.
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1 Model
Two firms indexed by i ∈ {X, Y } compete. Each draws an i.i.d. type θ ∈ {G,B},
interpreted respectively as good and bad, with Pr(G) = µ0 ∈ (0, 1). A continuum
of consumers of mass 1, indexed by v ∈ [0, v], is distributed according to the strictly
positive continuous pdf fv, with cdf Fv. Consumer types are independent of firm types.
All players know their own type, but only have a common prior belief over the types of
other players.
A type θ firm has marginal cost cθ, with cG > cB > 0. A type G firm has better
quality: a type v consumer values a type B firm’s product at v and G’s product at
h(v) ≥ v, with h′ ≥ 1 and h(v) > v. For some results, h is restricted to the form
h(v) = v + ν, with ν > 0. In this case, all consumers are willing to pay the same
premium for quality. Assume v > cG ≥ h(0), so demand for the good type firm is
positive. The previous assumption cB > 0 ensures that not all consumers buy from B
under complete information. Firms and consumers are risk-neutral. Consumers have
unit demand.
The firms observe their types and simultaneously set prices PX , PY ∈ [0, Pmax],
where Pmax ∈ (h(v),∞). A behavioural strategy of firm i maps its type to ∆R+.
2 The
probability that firm i’s type θ assigns to prices below P is denoted σθi (P ), so σ
θ
i (·) is
the cdf of price. The corresponding pdf is denoted
dσθi (P )
dP
if it exists.
After seeing the prices the firms, a consumer decides whether to buy from firm X
(denoted bX), firm Y (bY ) or not at all (n). The behavioural strategy σ : [0, v]×R
2
+ →
∆ {bX , bY , n} of a consumer maps his valuation and the prices to a decision.
The ex post payoff of a type θ firm if it sets price P and a mass D of consumers buy
from it is (P − cθ)D. Define vµ(P ) := inf{v : µh(v) + (1 − µ)v ≥ P}. In particular,
v1(·) = h
−1(·) and v0(·) = id(·). Total demand at price P and a fixed posterior belief µ of
the consumers is Dµ(P ) = 1−Fv(vµ(P )). If h(v) = v+ν, then D
µ(P ) = 1−Fv(P−µν).
The monopoly profit of type θ at P, µ is πmθ,µ(P ) = (P − cθ)D
µ(P ). The complete-
information monopoly profit πmB,0(P ) is denoted π
m
B (P ), and π
m
G,1(P ) denoted π
m
G (P ).
The monopoly price is Pmθ := argmaxP π
m
θ (P ). Assume that π
m
θ (P ) is single-peaked in
P . To avoid trivial separation, assume that PmB ≥ cG or π
m
B < (cG − cB)D
1(cG).
2Denote by ∆S the set of probability distributions on the set S.
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A consumer’s belief about firm i conditional on price P and the firm’s trategy σ∗i is
µi(P ) :=
µ0
d
dP
σG∗i (P )
µ0
d
dP
σG∗i (P ) + (1− µ0)
d
dP
σB∗i (P )
(1)
whenever µ0
d
dP
σG∗i (P ) + (1− µ0)
d
dP
σB∗i (P ) > 0. A discontinuity of height hθ in the cdf
σθ∗i is interpreted in the pdf as a Dirac δ function times hθ, thus makes the denominator
of (1) positive. A jump in σG∗i (·), but not σ
B∗
i (·) at P yields µi(P ) = 1, and a jump in
σB∗i (·), but not σ
G∗
i (·) results in µi(P ) = 0. If each σ
θ∗
i has an atom of respective size
hθ at P , then µi(P ) =
µ0hG
µ0hG+(1−µ0)hB
. Finally, if the denominator of (1) vanishes, then
choose an arbitrary belief.
The equilibrium notion is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), henceforth simply
called equilibrium: each player maximises its payoff given its belief about the strategies
of the others, and the beliefs are derived from Bayes’ rule when possible.
The minimal and maximal price of firm i’s type θ in a candidate equilibrium are
denoted P iθ and P iθ, respectively.
2 Results
First the benchmark of complete information is considered, which illustrates some gen-
eral features of the framework. After that, the case of private cost and quality is
examined.
One general observation is that among the consumers who end up buying, the ones
with a low valuation for good quality relative to bad sort to firms believed to have lower
quality, while the high valuation consumers go to expected high quality. If the quality
difference between the firm types is large compared to their cost difference and firms
draw unequal types, then the low quality firm is left with zero demand. Similarly, if
firm types differ and the variation in quality is small and in cost large, then the high
quality firm receives no customers.
2.1 Benchmark: complete information
Symmetric firms with publicly known qualities price at their marginal cost, regardless of
whether consumers are homogeneous or not and whether their quality premium h(v)−v
is constant or increasing.
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With asymmetric firms and a constant quality premium, one type prices at its
marginal cost and the other higher by just enough to make the consumers indifferent.
For example, if cG − cB > ν, then PG = cG and PB = cG − ν, but if cG − cB < ν, then
PG = cB+ν and PB = cB. Given the chance, all consumers leave the type with relatively
higher cost for its quality (if cG − cB > ν, then G, otherwise B), because otherwise
the type with the lower relative cost would undercut slightly. The outcome of one
type pricing at its marginal cost and receiving zero demand is standard in asymmetric
Bertrand competition.
In asymmetric price competition when the quality premium increases in consumer
valuation, define the indifferent consumer as v∗(PG − PB) := inf{v ≥ 0 : h(v) − v ≥
PG−PB}. Assume h
′ > 1, which ensures v∗ is a strictly increasing continuous function.
Consumers with valuations above v∗(PG − PB) buy from G, those below from B or
not at all—the latter if v < v0(PG, PB) := min {PB, h
−1(PG)}. A good type firm
who expects P ∗B solves maxPG(PG − cG)[1 − Fv(v
∗(PG − P
∗
B))] and a bad type solves
maxPB(PB − cB)[Fv(v
∗(P ∗G − PB)) − Fv(PB)]. Equilibrium exists, because prices may
w.l.o.g. be restricted to the convex compact interval [0, h(v)] and payoffs are continuous
in the action profiles.
If h(cB)− cG < 0 = cB − cB, then type B obtains positive demand even if G prices
at its marginal cost cG. Symmetrically, if h(v)− cG > v − cB, then G can attract some
customers facing PB = cB. Under these conditions, each type prices above its marginal
cost and obtains positive demand, unlike with homogeneous consumers or a constant
quality premium.
2.2 Incomplete information Bertrand competition
Results for the general case of an increasing quality premium for the good type are
presented first, followed in Section 2.2.1 by derivations that require the additional re-
striction of a constant quality premium. The first lemma proves that in any equilibrium,
if demand for a firm’s bad type is positive, then the bad type prices below the good and
obtains greater demand, strictly so under (partial) separation. The proof combines the
incentive constraints (ICs) of the types and is standard.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, Dµi(PiB)(PiB) ≥ D
µi(PiG)(PiG), and if D
µi(PiB)(PiB) > 0,
then PiG ≥ PiB, with equality iff D
µi(PiB)(PiB) = D
µi(PiG)(PiG). If D
µi(Piθ)(Piθ) > 0,
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then Piθ ≥ cθ.
Proof. Denote Dµi(Piθ)(Piθ) by Dθ to simplify notation. In any equilibrium, for any Piθ
in the support of σθ∗i , the incentive constraints ICG: (PiG − cG)DG ≥ (PiB − cG)DB
and ICB: (PiB − cB)DB ≥ (PiG − cB)DG hold. Rewrite the ICs as PiGDG − PiBDB ≥
cGDG − cGDB and cBDG − cBDB ≥ PiGDG − PiBDB. Using cθ > 0, the ICs become
PiGDG−PiBDB
cG
≥ DG − DB ≥
PiGDG−PiBDB
cB
. Then from cG > cB, we get DG ≤ DB and
PiGDG ≤ PiBDB.
In any equilibrium, if Dθ > 0, then Piθ ≥ cθ. Thus if DG > 0, then DB > 0,
otherwise B deviates to PiG ≥ cG > cB to get positive profit. If DB = DG > 0, then
the ICs imply PiG = PiB. The converse implication is obvious.
An implication of Lemma 1 is that the supports of σB∗i and σ
G∗
i have at most one
price in common. Thus if one type at a firm semipools, i.e. only sets prices that the
other type also chooses, then the semipooling type plays a pure strategy.
The next lemma rules out some equilibria even when belief threats are possible.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, at least one firm’s type B obtains positive demand. If
both types of firm i get zero demand, then both types of j set Pj > cG and receive positive
profit. If µ0h(cB) + (1− µ0)cB − cG ≤ 0 or type B of a profitable firm partly separates
or firms play symmetric strategies, then both firms’ B types obtain positive profit.
Proof. Suppose both types of both firms get zero demand in equilibrium. Then P > v
for all prices. Both types deviate to P ∈ (cG, v) to obtain positive demand and profit
even at the worst belief µi(P ) = 0. If firm i’s type G obtains positive demand, then
any PiG that G sets is above cG, otherwise G would deviate to P = cG. Demand and
profit are positive for iB, otherwise iB would deviate to PiG.
Suppose both types of firm j receive zero demand. Total demand at P < v is positive
at any belief, so both types of i obtain positive demand and profit at any Pi ∈ (cG, v).
Positive π∗iθ implies Piθ > cθ. If iB partly separates, i.e. sets PiB with µi(PiB) = 0, then
jB can get positive demand and profit by setting Pj ∈ (cB, PiB), regardless of µj(Pj).
If iB (semi)pools with iG, i.e. only sets prices that type G also sets, then there exists
Pi0 in the support of σiG s.t. µi(Pi0) ≤ µ0 and Pi0 > cG. If µ0h(cB)+(1−µ0)cB−cG ≤ 0,
then for ǫ > 0 small, consumers with valuations v ∈ (cB, cB + ǫ) strictly prefer to buy
from j at Pj ∈ (cB, v) and any belief, rather than from i at Pi0 > cG and µi(Pi0) ≤ µ0.
This makes jB deviate to Pj ∈ (cB, v) to get positive profit.
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Symmetric strategies imply that the firms split the total demand on average. Each
firm’s type G receives positive demand with probability at least µ0 (when the other
firm has type G). Then PG ≥ cG. Type B can imitate PG, thus π
∗
iB > 0.
The results of Lemma 2 are tight, in the sense that there exist equilibria where one
firm obtains zero demand, or both firms’ good types zero profit. An equilibrium in
which the good types receive zero profit is symmetric pooling on P0 = cG, which exists
if µ0h(cB) + (1− µ0)cB > cG and only if a weak inequality holds.
Equilibria where one firm obtains zero demand require µ0h(cB) + (1 − µ0)cB > cG
and asymmetric strategies. For example, firm X pools on some PX0 ∈ [cG, µ0h(cB) +
(1 − µ0)cB) and firm Y on some PY 0 ∈ (PX0, PX0 + ǫ) for ǫ > 0 small. Belief at Pi0,
i ∈ {X, Y } is µi(Pi0) = µ0, at other prices zero. Firm Y gets zero demand on or off the
equilibrium path from prices P ≥ cB, because if µ0h(cB)+(1−µ0)cB−PX0 > cB−cB = 0,
then all consumers with v ≥ cB prefer to buy at PX0 and µX(PX0) = µ0, rather than
at P = cB and µX(P ) = 0. Neither firm wants to deviate, because P 6= Pi0 results in
the worst belief and zero demand. Weakly dominated strategies are not played in this
equilibrium, provided PX0 > cG.
Some non-pooling equilibria also involve zero demand for one firm—modify the
preceding example so that each type of firm Y (partly) separates, for example B sets
PY B > v and G sets PY G > h(v). To ensure zero demand for Y , any PY θ receiving
positive probability must satisfy PY θ − Pi0 ≥ [µY (PY θ) − µ0][h(v) − v] for all v, which
holds if PY θ − [µY (PY θ) − µ0][h(v) − v] ≥ Pi0 for any µY (PY θ) ≥ µ0.
3 An additional
necessary condition for equilibria with PY B > v and PY G > h(v) is that firm X as
a monopolist does not deviate: (P − cθ)D
0(P ) ≤ (PX0 − cθ)D
µ0(PX0) for any θ and
P < PY B. This condition is easier to satisfy for smaller PY θ. Reducing PY θ makes the
requirement PY θ − Pi0 ≥ [µY (PY θ)− µ0][h(v)− v] harder to satisfy.
Asymmetric pooling passes the Intuitive Criterion under a constant quality premium
for some parameter values, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If h(v) − v = ν for all v, then the Intuitive Criterion does not eliminate
equilibria in which firm i pools on some Pi0 ∈ (cG, cB+µ0ν) and firm j on some Pj0 > Pi0
such that [Pj0 + (1− µ0)ν − cB][1− Fv(Pj0 − µ0ν)] > (Pi0 − cB)[1− Fv(Pi0 − µ0ν)].
3 The symmetric requirement that if µY (PY θ) ≤ µ0, then PY θ + [µ0 − µY (PY θ)][h(cB)− cB ] ≥ Pi0
holds whenever µ0h(cB)+ (1−µ0)cB > cG, which by Lemma 2 is necessary for one firm to obtain zero
demand.
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Proof. Let PY 0 > PX0 w.l.o.g., so that DY (PY 0) = 0. Asymmetric pooling equilibria
exist only if µ0h(cB)+(1−µ0)cB ≥ cG, by Lemma 2. If setting belief to µY (PY ) = 1 for
some PY results in DY (PY ) > 0, then both types of firm Y deviate, but if DY (PY ) = 0,
then neither type does. Thus for the firm with zero demand, the Intuitive Criterion has
no effect.
Consider the firm X with DX(PX0) > 0 and assume h(v)− v = ν for all v (constant
quality premium), in which case µ0h(cB) + (1 − µ0)cB ≥ cG becomes µ0ν ≥ cG − cB.
Define PX1 := PY 0 + (1− µ0)ν, which is the price that makes all consumers indifferent
between firms X and Y at beliefs µX = 1 and µY = µ0. Setting belief to µX(PX) = 1
for any PX > PX1 does not attract either type of firm X to deviate, because even at
the best belief, all consumers switch to firm Y .
If type G prefers P < PX0 to PX0, then so does type B.
Setting belief to µX(PX) = 1 for any PX ∈ (PX0, PX1] makes the bad type of X
deviate to PX if (PX1 − cB)[1− Fv(PX1 − ν)] > (PX0 − cB)[1− Fv(PX0 − µ0ν)]. This is
equivalent to (PY 0+(1−µ0)ν−cB)[1−Fv(PY 0−µ0ν)] > (PX0−cB)[1−Fv(PX0−µ0ν)],
which holds for PY 0−PX0 small enough, because Fv is continuous by assumption. Thus
there is no price P such that under the best belief, type G wants to deviate to P , but
type B prefers not to.
Symmetric pooling on P0 ∈ [cG, cB + (1 − µ0)ν) exists if cG < cB + (1 − µ0)ν and
passes the Intuitive Criterion by reasoning similar to Lemma 3. Take PX0 = PY 0 = P0.
If the firms set the same price, then assume they split the market equally. The bad
type deviates whenever the good type does if 1
2
(P0+(1−µ0)ν−cB)[1−Fv(P0−µ0ν)] >
(P0 − cB)[1− Fv(P0 − µ0ν)], i.e. (1− µ0)ν > P0 − cB.
In contrast to the constant quality premium case, the Intuitive Criterion eliminates
all pooling equilibria when the quality premium strictly increases in the consumer’s
valuation. The idea of the proof relies on profit at a fixed belief being continuous when
the quality premium is strictly increasing. At the best belief (certainty of the good
type), the bad type prefers to deviate to a price just above pooling and prefers not to
deviate to a high enough price, so by the Mean Value Theorem, there is a price at which
the bad type is indifferent. At prices just above this indifference and the best belief,
the good type still strictly prefers to deviate, which justifies the belief and eliminates
the candidate equilibrium.
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Lemma 4. If h′(v) > 1, then the Intuitive Criterion rules out any equilibria where the
support of σ∗iθ includes Pi0 with µi(Pi0) ∈ (0, 1) and Di(Pi0) > 0 and the support of σ
∗
jG
does not include Pj s.t. µj(Pj) = 1.
Proof. Recall that vµ(P ) := inf{v : µh(v)+(1−µ)v ≥ P}. For any Pj , firm i’s demand
Dµi (P ) =
∫ v
vµ(P )
1 {µh(v) + (1− µ)v − P > µj(Pj)h(v) + (1− µj(Pj))v − Pj}
+
1
2
1 {µh(v) + (1− µ)v − P = µj(Pj)h(v) + (1− µj(Pj))v − Pj} dFv(v)
decreases in P and increases in µ, strictly if Dµi (P ) ∈ (0, 1). Thus for any distribution
µ0σ
∗
jG + (1− µ0)σ
∗
jB over Pj , firm i’s expected demand decreases in P and increases in
µ, strictly if EDµi (P ) ∈ (0, 1).
If h′ > 1, then vµ(P ) is continuous in µ, P , and strictly increases in P and strictly
decreases in µ for P ∈ [µh(0), µh(v) + (1− µ)v]. If h′ > 1, then the inverse of h(v)− v
is continuous and on [h(0), h(v) − v], strictly increases in its argument. Further, if
h′ > 1 and µ 6= µj(Pj), then the indifference µh(v) + (1− µ)v−P = µj(Pj)h(v) + (1−
µj(Pj))v−Pj holds for at most one v ∈ [0, v]. Therefore if h
′ > 1 and µ 6= µj(Pj), then
Dµi (P ) =
∫ v
vµ(P )
1 {[µ− µj(Pj)][h(v)− v] > P − Pj} dFv(v)
is continuous in P, µ. In that case, for any distribution over Pj , the expected demand
and profit are continuous in P, µ.
Suppose w.l.o.g. that firm X does not fully separate and gets positive demand, i.e.
there exists PX0 chosen by both types of X , with DX(PX0) > 0. Being chosen by
both types implies µX(PX0) ∈ (0, 1) and by Lemma 1, PX0 ≥ cG and is unique. The
assumption cG > h(0) implies DX(PX0) < 1.
For any σ∗Y θ, µY (·), there exists PX1 large enough s.t. all consumers v ≥ cB prefer
firm Y to X even at belief µX = 1. Then firm X , in particular type B, does not deviate
from PX0 to PX ≥ PX1, because D
µ
X(PX) ≤ D
1
X(PX1) = 0 ∀µ.
Due to DX(PX0) ∈ (0, 1) and µX(PX0) < 1, we have D
1
X(PX0) > DX(PX0). Conti-
nuity ofD1X(·) is ensured, because the support of σ
∗
jG does not include Pj s.t. µj(Pj) = 1.
Thus for ǫ > 0 small enough, D1X(PX0 + ǫ) > DX(PX0).
Using the Mean Value Theorem and (PX0+ǫ−cB)D
1
i (PX0+ǫ) > (PX0−cB)D
µX(PX0)
i (PX0) >
(PX1 − cB)D
1
i (PX1), there exists P∗ ∈ (PX0, PX1) such that (P∗ − cB)D
1
i (P∗) = (PX0 −
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cB)D
µX(PX0)
i (PX0). Type B strictly prefers the equilibrium price PX0 to any P > P∗.
For ǫ > 0 small enough, type G strictly prefers P∗+ǫ to PX0, because the indifference of
B between PX0 and P∗ implies D
1
i (P∗) < D
µX(PX0)
i (PX0), thus (P∗− cB)D
1
i (P∗)− (cG−
cB)D
1
i (P∗) = (P∗− cB)D
µX(PX0)
i (PX0)− (cG− cB)D
1
i (P∗) > (PX0− cB)D
µX(PX0)
i (PX0)−
(cG − cB)D
µX(PX0)
i (PX0).
An immediate corollary of Lemma 4 is that equilibria where both firms pool are
removed by the Intuitive Criterion. In such equilibria, at least one firm obtains positive
demand without fully separating and the other firm’s good type does not separate.
Lemma 4 stands in contrast to the constant quality premium case in Lemma 3, where
all consumers switch firms at the same price, which makes profit discontinuous. Then
there exist parameter values such that for any price and belief combination, either both
types deviate to it or neither does. Simultaneous deviations mean that the Intuitive
Criterion cannot eliminate the equilibrium.
2.2.1 Constant quality premium
This section restricts attention to consumers who all have the same difference h(v)−v =
ν in their valuations for good and bad quality.
The following lemma shows that in any separating equilibrium, the bad type prices
strictly above its marginal cost. The intuition is that otherwise the bad type would
imitate G to make positive profit.
Lemma 5. In any separating equilibrium, P iB > cB, π
∗
iB > 0 and P iG > P iB + ν, and
if cG − cB ≤ ν, then P iG > cG and π
∗
iG > 0 for i ∈ {X, Y }.
Proof. Assume P iG ≤ P jG w.l.o.g., so Di(P iG) ≥
µ0
2
[1 − Fv(P iG − ν)] > 0. Firm i’s
type B has the option to set P iG and make positive profit, so π
∗
iB > 0. Then π
∗
jB > 0,
because jB can set P ∈ (cB, P iB) and attract all customers from iB. Positive profit
for B implies P iB > cB.
Suppose P iG ≤ P iB+ν, then any consumer who buys at P iB also buys at P iG. This
implies D1i (P iG) ≥ D
0
i (P iB), which motivates B to imitate G.
If cG − cB ≤ ν, then P iG > P iB + ν > cB + ν ≥ cG, therefore π
∗
iG > 0.
Lemma 6 shows that the bad types price below their monopoly level.
Lemma 6. In any separating equilibrium, P iB = P jB ≤ P
m
B for i ∈ {X, Y }.
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Proof. The result P iG > P iB + ν in Lemma 5 implies that if P iG − P jB ≥ P jG − P iB,
then all consumers at iG who do not leave the market switch to jB given the chance.
If all customers at iG prefer to switch to P jB, then P jB ≥ min {P
m
B , P iB}, because at
prices below P iB, firm j’s type B is a monopolist and deviating only improves belief
for B in a separating equilibrium. Thus demand after raising price from P jB is at least
as great as for a monopolist known to be type B.
By Lemma 5, P jG > P jB + ν and by the previous paragraph, P jB ≥ P iB, so due to
P jB ≥ P jB, all consumers at jG strictly prefer P iB. Thus P iB ≥ min
{
PmB , P jB
}
.
Suppose P iB > P
m
B ≤ P jB. Deviating from P iB to P
m
B results in demandD
µi(PmB )
i (P
m
B )
weakly above the monopoly level D0i (P
m
B ). In addition, some consumers may switch to
j when facing P iB, but none switch at P
m
B ≤ P jB ≤ P jB < P jG − ν. Thus demand
for iB increases relatively more than in a complete information monopoly environment,
where cutting price from P iB to P
m
B is profitable. The implication P iB ≤ P
m
B ≤ P jB
contradicts P iB > P
m
B ≤ P jB, therefore P iB = P jB ≤ P
m
B .
Separation implies positive profit by Lemma 5, so P iB > cB and a small enough
price cut does not lead to negative profit. Both firms’ B types choose an atomless price
distribution in any separating equilibrium, because belief threats do not deter the bad
type from undercutting an atom of the rival.
At P iB ≥ P jB, demand is only positive if the other firm is type G. Deviat-
ing from PiB > P
m
B to P
m
B increases demand from
1−σB∗j (PiB)
2
D0i (PiB) <
1
2
D0i (PiB)
to 1
2
D0i (P
m
B ) ≥
1
2
D0i (PiB), which is a greater increase than under complete informa-
tion monopoly. By assumption, monopoly profit under complete information is single
peaked, so the demand increase from PiB > P
m
B to P
m
B makes deviation profitable.
Therefore P iB ≤ P
m
B for each firm.
Demand is positive on the support of prices, otherwise B would deviate to cB + ǫ.
Positive demand and π∗G ≥ 0 imply that the support of the equilibrium strategies is
weakly above cG. The assumption v > cG implies that the prices are strictly above cG,
because otherwise G would deviate to P = cG+ǫ even at the worst belief µi(cG+ǫ) = 0.
Thus under incomplete information, price is always strictly above marginal cost for both
types, which differs from a situation with public cost and quality, as shown in the next
section.
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2.2.2 Comparison to public positively correlated quality and cost
Incomplete information may increase or decrease prices in Bertrand competition, as
shown in this section for positive correlation of cost and quality (the case of nega-
tive correlation is in Section 2.3.1). This indeterminate effect contrasts with costly
search (Heinsalu, 2019), where asymmetric information greatly enhances competition
(decreases price from monopoly to competitive) under negatively associated quality and
cost, but reduces competition under positive correlation.
Under complete information Bertrand competition with positively correlated cost
and quality, if cG − cB > ν, then trade occurs at PG = cG with probability µ
2
0, at
PB = cG − ν with probability 2µ0(1 − µ0) and at PB = cB with probability (1 − µ0)
2.
If instead cG − cB < ν, then the trading price is PG = cG with probability µ
2
0, is
PG = cB + ν > cG with probability 2µ0(1−µ0) and PB = cB with probability (1−µ0)
2.
By contrast, incomplete information implies that trade occurs at a (semi)pooling
price P0 > cG (with probability at least 1 − µ
2
0) or a semiseparating price PiGs >
P0 + (1 − µ0)ν. The ex ante expected price under incomplete information is higher
than under complete iff either cG − cB ≥ ν or µ0 /∈ (µ0, µ0) ⊂ (0, 1). Prices are always
strictly above marginal cost when the marginal cost and quality are private, but when
these are public, then at least one firm charges a price equal to its marginal cost.
2.2.3 Comparison to homogeneous consumers
If information is complete or cost and quality are negatively related (as in Section 2.3),
then the strategies of the firms against homogeneous and heterogeneous consumers
are the same. However, under incomplete information and positive correlation of cost
and quality, Janssen and Roy (2015) Proof of Proposition 2 initially claims the unique
symmetric D1 equilibrium:
(a) If vB > cB + vG − vB, then PG = vG > vB > cB + vG − vB.
(b) If vB ≤ cB+ vG−vB , then PG = max {cG, cB + 2(vG − vB)} and all consumers buy.
From the second paragraph on, Janssen and Roy (2015) Proof of Proposition 2 says:
(a) If vB ≥ cB + vG − vB, then PG = cB + 2(vG − vB) and type B mixes over PB ∈
[cB + µ0(vG − vB), cB + vG − vB].
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(b) If vB < cB + vG− vB, then PG = vG and type B mixes over [cB +µ0(vB − cB), vB].
Nonnegative profit for G requires PG = cB + 2(vG − vB) ≥ cG, so incomplete informa-
tion always increases PG, sometimes strictly. If cG − cB ≤ vG − vB, then incomplete
information strictly increases PB, but if cG − cB > vG − vB and µ0 <
cG−cB−vG+vB
vB−cB
,
then there is a positive probability that PB is lower under incomplete information. As
µ0 → 0, the probability of trade at PB goes to 1 in both cases.
2.3 Negatively correlated cost and quality
In this section, the only differences from Section 2.2 are that a firm with good quality
has a lower cost, the gains from trade are positive for a bad quality firm, but not all
consumers buy at the bad type’s cost, and the complete information monopoly profit
of the good type increases in price for prices below the bad type’s cost. Formally,
cG < cB < v, cB ≥ h(0) and
d
dP
P [1 − Fv(h
−1(P ))] > 0 for all P ∈ [0, cB]. Normalise
cG = 0 w.l.o.g.
Analogously to Lemma 1, demand and price are monotone in type in any equilib-
rium, but due to cG < cB, the direction of the monotonicity switches. Denote by Di(P )
the equilibrium demand for firm i at price P .
Lemma 7. In any equilibrium for any Pθ in the support of σ
θ∗
i , Di(PG) ≥ Di(PB), and
if Di(PB) > 0, then PG ≤ PB.
Proof. If PBDi(PB)− cBDi(PB) ≥ PGDi(PG)− cBDi(PG) and PGDi(PG) ≥ PBDi(PB),
then PBDi(PB)− cBDi(PB) ≥ PBDi(PB)− cBDi(PG).
In equilibrium, Di(PB) > 0⇒ PB ≥ cB, otherwise B deviates to P ≥ cB.
If (PB − cB)Di(PB) ≥ (PG− cB)Di(PG) and Di(PG) ≥ Di(PB) > 0, then PB − cB ≥
PG − cB.
The next lemma, similarly to Lemma 2, rules out some equilibria even when belief
threats are possible.
Lemma 8. In any equilibrium, at least one firm’s type G obtains positive profit. If
type G of firm i gets zero demand, then both types of j set Pj > cB and receive positive
demand and profit. If µ0h(0) < cB or at least one firm partly separates or firms play
symmetric strategies, then type G of each firm obtains positive profit.
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Proof. Suppose π∗iG = 0 for both firms. Then for each firm and any PiG in the support
of σG∗i , either PiG = 0 or Di(PiG) = 0. If PiG = 0 ≤ PjG, then Di(0) > 0, so type B of
firm i separates and sets PiB > 0. Then jG has probability 1 − µ0 of facing iB with
PiB > 0 and µi(PiB) = 0, so jG obtains positive demand and profit from P ∈ (0, PiB)
for any belief µj(P ). Thus PjG > 0 and π
∗
jG > 0.
Suppose Di(PiG) = 0, then Di(P ) = 0 for any P > 0, otherwise iG would deviate
to P to get positive profit. Total demand DX(P ) + DY (P ) is positive for any P < v
for any beliefs µX(P ), µY (P ), so if Di(P ) = 0, then Dj(P ) > 0. Then both types of j
get positive profit from any Pˆ ∈ (cB, v), thus jB sets PjB > cB.
If jB partly separates, i.e. sets PjB with µj(PjB) = 0, then both types of firm i can
get positive demand and profit by setting Pi ∈ (cB, PjB), regardless of µi(Pi).
If jB (semi)pools with jG, then there exists Pj0 chosen by both jB and jG with
µj(Pj0) ≤ µ0. If µ0h(0) < cB, then for ǫ > 0 small, consumers with valuations v ∈ (0, ǫ)
strictly prefer to buy from i at Pi ∈ (0, v) and any belief, rather than from j at Pj0 ≥ cB
and µj(Pj0) ≤ µ0. This makes iG deviate to Pi ∈ (0, v) to get positive profit.
If the firms play symmetric strategies, then consumers’ beliefs are µX(P ) = µY (P )
for any P chosen in equilibrium, thus DX(P ) = DY (P ). From DX(P ) + DY (P ) > 0
for any P < v, we get PiB ≥ cB, otherwise B would deviate to Pd ≥ cB to obtain
nonnegative profit. Type G can imitate PiB ≥ cB and receive Di(PiB) > 0, thus
π∗iG > 0.
Similarly to Lemma 2, the results of Lemma 8 are tight. Asymmetric pooling (both
types of firm i set Pi0 > cB and both types of j set Pj0 ∈ (cB, Pi0)) ensures zero profit
for both types of j. Symmetric pooling on cB guarantees zero profit for the bad types.
Unlike under positive correlation of cost and quality, additional results do not require
a constant quality premium h(v) − v. This is because all consumers prefer type G at
PG ≤ PB. The Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) selects a unique equilibrium,
as shown below.
Theorem 9. In the unique equilibrium passing the Intuitive Criterion, PB = cB and
type G mixes on [PG, cB), where PG[1 − Fv(h
−1(PG))] = cB(1 − µ0)[1 − Fv(h
−1(cB))]
and the cdf of price is
σG∗i (P ) =
1
µ0
−
cB(1− µ0)[1− Fv(h
−1(cB))]
µ0P [1− Fv(h−1(P ))]
.
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Proof. First, rule out equilibria where some firm’s type G gets zero profit. Lemma 8
proved that π∗iG = PiGDi(PiG) > 0 for at least one firm. Due to Di(PiG) ≤ 1, any PiG
in the support of σG∗i is bounded below by π
∗
iG > 0. Denote by P iθ the lowest price
in the support of σθ∗i . To apply the Intuitive Criterion to show π
∗
jG > 0 for j 6= i, set
µj(P ) = 1 for P ∈ (0,min {P iG, cB}). Then all consumers with h(v) ≥ P buy from
firm j at P . Suppose π∗jG = 0, then jG strictly prefers P to its equilibrium price, but
jB strictly prefers its equilibrium profit π∗jB ≥ 0 to the negative profit from P < cB.
This justifies µj(P ) = 1 and removes any equilibrium with π
∗
jG = 0.
Second, rule out (partial) pooling. Positive profit for G implies positive demand,
so pooling is only possible on Pi0 ≥ cB, otherwise B would deviate to nonnegative
profit. Define P∗ := sup {P ≤ Pi0 : (P − cB)D
1
i (P ) < π
∗
iB}. Due to π
∗
iG > 0, we have
Di(P0) > 0, so P∗ ≥ cB. To apply the Intuitive Criterion to rule out (partial) pooling
on Pi0 ≥ cB, set µi(P ) = 1 for all P < P∗. Because iB puts positive probability on Pi0,
we have µi(Pi0) < 1. Then for ǫ > 0 small enough, (Pi0 − ǫ)D
1(Pi0 − ǫ) > Pi0Di(Pi0),
so G strictly prefers to deviate to Pi0 − ǫ, but B strictly prefers the equilibrium. This
justifies µi(Pi0 − ǫ) = 1 and removes (partial) pooling.
Combining separation of types with Lemma 7 shows PiG < PiB. All consumers
strictly prefer PiG at µi(PiG) = 1 to PiB at µi(PiB) = 0, so iB only gets positive
demand if firm j has type B. The bad types Bertrand compete, so undercut each other
to PB = cB.
The good types mix atomlessly by the standard reasoning for Bertrand competition
with captive customers. Atoms invite undercutting. The good types’ price competition
cannot reach P = 0, because with positive probability, the other firm has type B and
sets PB = cB. This makes type G strictly prefer P = cB − ǫ to P ≤ ǫ for ǫ > 0 small
enough.
Denote by P iθ the supremum of the support of σ
θ∗
i . Combining separation, PiG ≤
PiB and PiB = cB yields P iG ≤ cB for both firms.
Suppose P iG ≤ P jG < cB. If σ
G∗
i has an atom at P iG and P iG = P jG, then set
µj(P jG − ǫ) = 1 for ǫ > 0 small enough and jG will deviate from P jG to undercut
P iG. Type B of firm j strictly prefers not to set P jG − ǫ. Thus the Intuitive Criterion
justifies µj(P jG − ǫ) = 1 and eliminates equilibria with an atom at P iG = P jG < cB.
If σG∗i has no atom at P iG or P iG < P jG, then demand at P jG is only positive when
firm i has type B. Set µj(P ) = 1 for all P ∈ [P jG, cB), then Dj(P ) > 0 iff firm i has type
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B, in which case jG is a monopolist on P ∈ [P jG, cB). By assumption, the complete
information monopoly profit PD1(P ) strictly increases on [0, cB], so G strictly prefers
any P ∈ (P jG, cB) to P jG. Type B strictly prefers not to set P < cB. Therefore the
Intuitive Criterion justifies µj(P ) = 1 and eliminates equilibria with P iG ≤ P jG < cB.
Suppose P iG < P jG, then set µi(P ) = 1 for all P ∈ [P iG, P jG]. Then for any
P ∈ [P iG, P jG), all customers who end up buying buy from i. Because PD
1(P ) strictly
increases on [0, cB], type G of firm i will deviate from P iG to any P ∈ [P iG, P jG). This
rules out P iG < P jG.
Price P iG ≤ P jG attracts all customers with h(v) ≥ P iG. Profit from P iG is
P iG[1 − Fv(h
−1(P iG))], which must equal the profit cB(1 − µ0)[1 − Fv(h
−1(cB))] from
P iG = cB. This determines P iG. Type G must be indifferent between all P ∈ [P iG, cB)
in the support of σG∗i , which determines firm j’s mixing cdf σ
G∗
j by P [1−µ0σ
G∗
j (P )][1−
Fv(h
−1(P ))] = cB(1−µ0)[1−Fv(h
−1(cB))]. The same indifference condition for j deter-
mines σG∗i , so σ
G∗
X = σ
G∗
Y . Solving for σ
G∗
i yields σ
G∗
i (P ) =
1
µ0
− cB(1−µ0)[1−Fv(h
−1(cB))]
µ0P [1−Fv(h−1(P ))]
.
The equilibrium selected by the Intuitive Criterion in Theorem 9 is similar to the
symmetric equilibrium in the homogeneous consumer case studied in Janssen and Roy
(2015) Lemma A.1 in which PB = cB and type G mixes atomlessly over [(1 − µ0)cB +
µ0cG, cB]. Thus trade occurs at cB with probability (1−µ0)
2, otherwise at some PG < cB.
The ex ante expected price under incomplete information is lower than under complete
iff µ0 /∈ (µ, µ) ⊂ (0, 1).
The above symmetric equilibrium is not unique, contrary to the claim in Janssen and Roy
(2015) Lemma A.1. For example, both firms pooling on P0 = cB is an equilibrium when
cB is below a cutoff. Similarly, with heterogeneous consumers, pooling on cB is an equi-
librium for low cB. However, it does not pass the Intuitive Criterion, regardless of
whether valuations differ among customers or not. If belief is set to 1 on prices below
cB, then the good types will deviate to cB − ǫ and at least double their demand.
2.3.1 Comparison to public negatively correlated quality and cost
This section compares competition under incomplete and complete information when
cost and quality are negatively associated. When both firms have the same type, both
price at their marginal cost, as usual in symmetric Bertrand competition. Thus trade
occurs at price cG = 0 with probability µ
2
0 (when both firms have type G), but at cB
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with probability (1−µ0)
2. For asymmetric firms and a constant quality premium, trade
occurs at cB + ν. The probability of unequal types is 2µ0(1− µ0).
By contrast, incomplete information results in PB = cB and type G mixing atom-
lessly over [PG, cB) for some PG > 0. Therefore trade occurs at cB with probability
(1 − µ0)
2, otherwise at some PG < cB. The ex ante expected price under incomplete
information is lower than under complete iff µ0 /∈ (µ, µ) ⊂ (0, 1).
Now assume that h(v)− v increases in v, strictly for some v. Focus on asymmetric
firms. Type B does not set any P < cB attracting positive demand, thus type G is
a monopolist on P < h(cB). If the complete information monopoly price P
m
G of the
good type is below h(cB), then G sets P
m
G , type B gets zero demand and may set any
P ≥ h−1(PmG ). This outcome is similar to the case of a constant quality premium.
The more interesting case is PmG > h(cB),
4 where type G raises price until the
consumers with the lowest valuations above cB prefer to switch to B charging PB = cB.
These switchers are captive for type B, inducing it to raise price above cB, which in
turn loosens the incentive constraint of type G, allowing it to raise price. The good type
ends up pricing between h(cB) and P
m
G , and the bad type strictly above cB. This result
is similar to the above-competitive pricing found in Section 2.1 for positively correlated
public cost and quality, but differs from privately known cost and quality.
Unlike with public types, private information about negatively correlated cost and
quality leads to PG < PB = cB, with PG > cG = 0, and if the firms have different types,
then demand for the bad type is zero (Theorem 9). The reason is that the good type
signals its private quality by reducing price. Overall, price may end up higher or lower
than under public cost and quality.
3 Conclusion
Customer heterogeneity turns out to be important for optimal pricing decisions when
better quality producers have higher costs, independently of private information about
cost and quality. When higher quality costs less, firms price similarly when facing
heterogeneous consumers as when homogeneous. Because information is valuable only
if it changes decisions, a firm may estimate the value of gathering information on
consumer preferences using its own and competitors’ cost and quality data, if available.
4Sufficient for Pm
G
> h(cB) is
d
dP
P [1− Fv(h
−1(P ))] > 0 for all P ∈ [0, h(cB)].
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Asymmetric information about qualities and costs substantively affects pricing only
when higher quality firms have a lower marginal cost. If smaller cost implies better
quality, then a low price can credibly signal quality. This is because cutting price
reduces the profit less for a firm with lower cost. In some situations, other costly signals
of quality are feasible, for example advertising or warranties, but in other markets such
as insurance, warranties are uncommon. Even if available, warranties or advertisements
may not be the best way to signal—price cuts may be a cheaper or more accurate way
for a high quality firm to distinguish itself.
A low price used as a signal is similar to limit pricing, i.e. a monopolist keeping
potential entrants out of the market by convincing them of its low cost by way of a low
price. In limit pricing, charging a low price is anti-competitive, unlike in this paper.
One policy implication of this paper is that a regulator maximising total or consumer
surplus should discourage quality certification (and other methods to make quality pub-
lic) when cost and quality are negatively correlated across firms and private. However,
when better quality producers have higher costs, publicising quality may increase or
decrease price and total and consumer surplus. Making information complete improves
welfare ex ante when firms’ types are unknown if the cost difference between firms is
expected to be large relative to the quality difference or consumers are nearly certain
of the firms’ types. Thus in mature industries, certification is likely to increase surplus.
If the regulator knows the firms’ costs and qualities, then welfare-maximisation
suggests that with symmetric firms, this information should be revealed. If the firms
differ and the better quality producer has a lower cost, then revelation reduces surplus.
With asymmetric firms where the higher quality one has a greater cost, the price effect
of making information public depends on the relative qualities and costs.
The comparison between positively and negatively associated cost and quality sug-
gests other policy implications. To maximise welfare under privately known cost and
quality, the correlation between these should be made negative. Two ways to do this
are to reward good quality (industry prizes for the best product) and punish for flawed
products (fines, lawsuits). The quality of larger firms should be checked the most fre-
quently to give them the greatest motive to improve it, because they are likely the low
cost producers. Firms whose quality and cost are uncertain to consumers (e.g. start-
ups) should receive targeted assistance with cost reduction if their quality is high, and
with quality improvement if their costs are low.
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If qualities and costs are negatively associated and private, then a merger to duopoly
need not increase prices by much. Thus the optimal antitrust policy depends on the
correlation of cost and quality in an industry.
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